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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEw

waters. Free access to the surface of the lakes of Minnesota is desirable if
16
the development of trade common to such areas is to be exploited.
ROBERT D. HARTL.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS -

RULES AND REGULATIONS -

REASONABLE-

NESS AND VALIDITY. - The Board of Education, prior to the 1958 school term,
adopted a rule which barred married high school students from participating
in co-curricular activities. In a mandamus proceeding by the parents of married high school students to compel the board of education to allow the
students to play football, the trial court held that the defendant school district
did not violate the statute guaranteeing to all students an equal right to public
educational facilities. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in a 3, 1, 4 decision,
held that the judgment be affirmed. Four judges supported the contention
that the rule, which is admitted to be punitive, is violative of public policy in
attacking the married status of these students as "wrongdoing". Three judges
contended public policy does not favor marriages when consummated under
the ages of twenty-one for the male and eighteen for the female, and that the
rule is reasonable as being within the general discretionary powers of the
school board. The remaining judge affirmed the decision but only on the
ground that the question was moot. Cochrane v. Board of Ed. of Mesick
Consol. Sch. Dist., 103 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 1960).
As a general rule decisions of school boards affecting the good order and
discipline of the school are final when they relate to the right of pupils to2
enjoy school privileges.1 Courts are not concerned with errors of judgment,
.but the reasonableness of regulations is a question of law for the courts despite the presumption that such regulations ate a reasonable exercise of dis-4
3
Whether a rule is reasonable is subject to inquiry by the courts,
cretion.
and they may compel, by mandamus, the directors of a school to admit a
pupil unlawfully excluded.9
It has been held that to expell a student from school because of marriage
t
is an abuse of a school board's discretionary power. There is no doubt a
student may be punished for a breach of discipline, or for an offense against
7
good morals, but not for innocent acts. An act penalizing the conduct of
Wherein the count took
16. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791, 795 (Fla. 1959)
judicial notice of "tourism" and calculated that immeasurable damage would result if

guests were restricted to fishing and swimming only in the waters within a host's property
lines; State v. Adams, supra at note 8.

1. See Batty v. Board of Education, 67 N.D. 6, 269 N.W. 49, 50 (1936).
2. See e.g., State v. Walker, 88 Ga. 413, 76 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1953).
3. Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, Multonomah County, 195 Ore. 471, 246 P.2d 566,
576 (1952)
4. Kinzer v. Directors of Independent School Dist., 129 Iowa 441, 105 N.W. 686, 687
(1906).
5. Perkins

v. Ind. School Dist.

of West Des

Moines,

56 Iowa

476, 9 N.W. 356

(1880).
6. Nutt v. Board of Education, 128 Kan. 507, 278 Pac. 1065 (1929); McLeod v. State,
154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929). But see, State v. Marion County Board of Educa-

tion, 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57, 58 (1957) (masried student was expelled for remainder of term with the right to return the following term); Kissick v. Garland Independent School District, 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (Practically the same factual

case. The court found that resituation was evident in this case as in the instant
stricting the privileges of a married student was not an abuse of discretion).
7. Perkins v. Ind. School Dist. of West Des Moines, 56 Iowa 476, 9 N.W. 356 (1880).
See also 35 Cyc. 1135, ". . . it has been held that a rule is not reasonable which will
deprive a child of school privileges except as a punishment for a breach of discipline or an
offense against good morals . . ."
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students in state institutions, which conduct has no relation to the welfare of
s
the institution, has also been held to be unreasonable.
It is true that state statutes generally restrict the marriages of males under
twenty-one and females under eighteen by requiring the consent of their parents prior to the issuance of a marriage license,9 but this restriction does not
necessarily mean that public policy disfavors such marriages after consuma10
tion.
A few states have even shown favoritism towards minors after marriage by extending their legal rights.11
A consummated marriage contract subjects the parties to the most important
of social institutions, and the public policy which supervenes to maintain a
12
marriage is correspondingly strong.
It is evident that a school board should only penalize when a breach of
discipline or good morals has occured.
Neither such breach has occured in
this instance, yet the school board has undoubtedly passed a punitive regulation. It is very questionable whether the welfare of the school will be endangered, and also whether the penalty was prescribed with the "good" of the
school in mind.
Furthermore, it seems a marriage once entered into should
be, and is, favored by public policy. The view point has been expressed that
school board members often yield to various social forces in a community in
suppressing educational freedom.la Such seems to be the case here.
SERGE H.

SOCIAL SECURITY

-

UNEMPLOYMENT

GARRISON.

COIPENSION

-

Is

CONSCIENTIOUS OB-

JECTION TO SIGNING A LOYALTY OATH GOOD CAUSE FOR REFUSAL OF SUITABLE

Plaintiff, who was receiving benefits from the California Unemployment Commission, was disqualified for refusing to accept employment
with a county agency because he conscientiously objected to a loyalty oath required of all California civil servants. Plaintiff maintained that this was good
cause for refusal. The Supreme Court of California held, two justices dissenting, that when an applicant declines to take an oath and states his own conEMPLOYMENT? -

scientious objection to the taking, and there is no finding that his stated objection is a sham for the purpose of avoiding work or is otherwise false, the
applicant may not be denied such unemployment insurance benefits as would
otherwise be payable. Syrek v. California Unemployment Insurance App. Bd.,
354 P.2d 625 (Calif. 1960).
All of the states in this country have some system of unemployment com8. Gentry v. Memphis Federation of Musicians, 177 Tenn. 566, 151 S.W.2d 1081
(1941) (It was found that the act in question disavowed any purpose to promote discipline or benefit the school). In the present case only one school board member, when
questioned, mentioned that action was taken for the "good" of the school and this was in
reply to a leading question.
9. See, e.g., N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0302 (1943)"... If the male is under the age
of twenty-one years, or the female under the age of eighteen years, a marriage license
shall not be issued without the consent of the parents or guardian, if there are any."
10. See In re Anonymous, 32 N.J. Super. 599, 108 A.2d 882, 887 (1954)
"...
the
purpose of the statute 'is to discourage child marriages and to protect children from the
consequences which a binding marriage involves."
11. See 41 Iowa L. Rev. 436 (1956) "Whatever effect marriage has on minority in
Iowa is based on section 599.1 of the 1954 Iowa Code, which provides that 'the period
of minority extends to the age of twenty-one years, but all minors attain their majority by
marriage' . . ." Other states with similar statutes are Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, and Utah.
12. Gress v. Gress, 209 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
13. 59 Yale L.J. 929, 930 (1950).

